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CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT SOVEREIGNTY
RACHEL DENAE THRASHER* AND KEVIN P. GALLAGHER"

This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world tradingregime
leaves nations the "policy space" to deploy effective policy for long-run
diversification and development and the extent to which there is a convergence of
such policy space under global and regional trade regimes. We examine the
economic theory of trade and long-run growth and underscore the fact that
traditional theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run dynamic
comparative advantages and when market failures are rife. We then review a
"toolbox" of policies that have been deployed by developed and developing
countriespast andpresent to kick-start diversity and development with the hope of
achieving long-run growth. Next, we examine the extent to which rules under the
World Trade Organization(WTO), trade agreements between the European Union
(EU) and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US)
and developing countries, and those among developing countries (South-South, or
S-S, agreements) allow for the use ofsuch policies. We demonstrate that there is a
great divergence among trade regimes over this question. While S-S agreements
provide ample policy space for industrial development, the WTO and EU
agreements largely represent the middle of the spectrum in terms of constraining
policy space choices. On the far end, opposite S-S agreements, US agreements
place considerablymore constraintsby bindingparties both broadly and deeply in
their trade commitments.
I. INTRODUCTION

Development is a long-run process of transforming an economy from
concentrated assets based on primary products, to a diverse set of assets based on
knowledge. This process involves investing in human, physical and natural capital
in manufacturing and services and divesting in rent seeking, commerce, and

* Rachel Denae Thrasher is a research fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the
Longer-Range Future at Boston University. Her work focuses on international trade agreements and
their implications for economic development in the developing countries of Latin America. She holds
both a law degree and a master's degree in International Relations from Boston University.
Kevin P. Gallagher is an associate professor of international relations at Boston University and
faculty fellow at the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. Most recently he is
editor of the book Putting Development First: The Importance of Policy Space at the WTO and IFIs,
and the co-author of The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American
Industrialization.
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unsustainable agriculture.' Imbs and Waczairg 2 have confirmed that nations that
develop follow this trajectory. They find that as nations get richer, sectoral
production and employment move from a relatively high concentration to
diversity. They find such a process is a long one and that nations do not stabilize
their diversity until they reach a mean income of over $15,000.4 For many years it
has also been known that as countries diversify they also undergo a process of
deepening whereby the endogenous productive capacities of domestic firms are
enhanced through forward and backward linkages.
This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world trading regime
leaves nations the "policy space" to deploy effective policy for long-run
diversification and development, and the extent to which there is a convergence of
such policy space under global and regional trade regimes. Part I of the paper
examines the economic theory of trade and long-run growth and underscores the
fact that traditional theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run
dynamic comparative advantages and when market failures are rife. We then
exhibit a "toolbox" of policies that have been deployed by developed and
developing countries past and present to kick start diversity and development with
the hope of achieving long-run growth but also stress that tools alone are not the
recipe for development, that "getting the political economy right" is also of vital
importance. In Part II, we examine the extent to which rules under the World
Trade Organization (WTO), trade agreements between the European Union (EU)
and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US) and
developing countries, and developing country-developing country trade
agreements (or South-South, S-S) allow for the use of such policies. Part III of the
paper summarizes our findings and offers conclusions for policy and future
research. This paper is intended to assist policy-makers as they choose trade
partners that affect their ability to design long-run development strategies.
A. Trade Theory and the Long Run
The traditional trade theory that provides the backdrop and justification for
the majority of trade treaties is limited in terms of long-run growth for developing
countries. Such theories assume a static approach to technological change and
assume that there are no market failures among trading partners,6 two assumptions
that do not hold in the developing country context. This section of the paper
provides an overview of trade theory and its limitations and shows how some

1. ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE REST: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE
INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter AMSDEN].
2. Jean Imbs & Romain Waczraig, Stages of Diversification, 93 AM. EcoN. REV. 63, 83, Mar.

(2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.at 69.
5. See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1988)
[hereinafter HIRSCHMAN]; PAUL KRUGMAN, DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY
(1995) [hereinafter KRUGMAN]; AMSDEN, supra note 1.
6. See RICHARD CAVES, JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & RONALD JONES, WORLD TRADE AND
PAYMENTS 13-30 (2007) [hereinafter CAVES].
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countries have used various tools to correct for the theoretical limitations
identified.
Neo-classical trade theory demonstrates that liberalizing trade can make all
parties better off. The economist David Ricardo showed that because countries
face different costs to produce the same product, if each country produces and then
exports the goods for which it has comparatively lower costs, then all parties
benefit. The effects of comparative advantage (as Ricardo's notion became
called) on factors of production were developed in the "Heckscher-Ohlin" model.
This model assumes that in all countries there is perfect competition, technology is
constant and readily available, there is the same mix of goods and services, that
factors of production (such as capital and labor) can freely move between
industries, and there are no externalities. 9 In other words, this model is "static" and
not "dynamic" and there are no market failures.
Within this rubric, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem adds that international
trade can fetch a higher price for the products (and hence lead to higher overall
welfare) in which a country has a comparative advantage. 10 In terms of foreign
direct investment (FDI), multinational corporations (MNCs) moving to another
country) can contribute to development by increasing employment and by human
capital and technological "spillovers" where foreign presence accelerates the
introduction of new technology and investment." In theory, the gains from trade
accruing to "winning" sectors freed to exploit their comparative advantages have
the (Pareto) possibility to compensate the "losers" of trade liberalization.
Moreover, if the net gains from trade are positive there are more funds available to
stimulate growth and protect the environment. In a perfect world then, free trade
and increasing exports could indeed be unequivocally beneficial to all parties.
To some, static comparative advantage poses problems for countries who
want to sustain long-run growth. Some countries may only have a static
comparative advantage in a single commodity where prices are very volatile and
where longer-run prices are on the decline relative to industrial goods. What's
more, small initial comparative static advantages among countries in the short-run
may expand into a growing technology gap between rich and poor nations in the
longer-run. 12 If the developed world has a static comparative advantage in
innovation, it can continually stay ahead by introducing new products, even if the

7. DAVID RICARDO, ON PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 116-117 (1911).
8. See B.G. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-27 (1967).

9. Id.
10. See Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, Protectionand Real Wages, 9 REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 58, 65 (1941).
11. See, e.g., Tiru K. Jyaraman & Balgeet Singh, Foreign Direct Investment and Employment
Creation in Pacific Island Countries: An Empirical Study of Fli, ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH AND
TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE, Working Paper Series No. 35, at 2, May 2007,
http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp3507.pdf.
12. Robert Lucas, On the Mechanisms of Economic Development, 22 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 3,
15 (1988), http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/LucasMechanicsEconomicGrowth.pdf.
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developing world eventually catches up and gains a comparative advantage in lowcost production of each old product over time. 13
In the longer-run then, what matters most is not static comparative advantage
at any one moment in time, but the ongoing pattern of dynamic comparative
advantage: the ability to follow one success with another, to build on one industry
by launching another, again and again.
Since the process of technology
development is characterized by increasing returns, many models will have
multiple equilibria. It is easy to specify a model in which the choice between
multiple equilibria is not uniquely determined by history; rather, it becomes
possible for public policy to determine which equilibrium will occur. 14 If, in such
a model, the multiple equilibria include high-tech, high-growth paths as well as
traditional, low-growth futures, then public policy may make all the difference in
development.
Neo-classical trade theory also assumes that there are no market failures
among trading partners." However, four key market failures plague nations
seeking to catch up to the developed world: coordination and information
externalities, dynamism and technological change, and human capital formation. 16
"Diversification by definition can mean the creation of whole new industries in an
economy and sometimes may require linking new industry to necessary
intermediate goods markets, labor markets, roads and ports, and final product
markets. For fifty years economic theorists have demonstrated how markets fail at
'coordinating' these efforts." 17
"Coordination failures and the asymmetric
distribution of world income has led economists to argue that the nation state
should provide 'big push' investments to build scale economies and enhance the
complimentary demand and supply functions of various industries" over the long
U .18
1
run.

While historically such efforts took the form of large industrial planning
efforts and infant industry protection, more recently industrial clustering has taken
place where nations focus on the development of specific technologies or sectors in
specific geographical regions-especially when facing scale economies. 19
Clustering and export processing zones have been created to attract foreign firms,
link them to domestic input providers, and serve as exporting platforms. 20 To
support these efforts, nations (most successfully in Asia) provide tax breaks and
drawbacks to foreign firms but required them to source from domestic firms and
13. Paul Krugman, A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distributionof
Income, 87 J. OF POL. ECON. 253, 254 (1979).
14. Paul Krugman, History Versus Expectations, 106 Q. J. OF EcoN. 651, 666 (1991).
15. CAVES, supra note 6.
16. Nagesh Kumar & Kevin P. Gallagher, Relevance of 'Policy Space' for Development:
Implications for Multilateral Trade Negotiations, RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Discussion Paper # 120, at 6, Mar. 2007, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/ Pubs/
rpRISDiscPaperl20Apr07.pdf [hereinafter Kumar & Gallagher].
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7.
19. See AMSDEN, supranote 1, at 74.
20. Id. at 75.
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transfer technology.2 1 In tandem, the state provides an educated labor force, public
R&D, tariff protection, and subsidized credit to support the domestic firms, and
provided export subsidies to the domestic firms until they could produce products
at the global technological frontier.
Markets also fail at providing the socially optimal amount of "information" to
producers and consumers as well-such phenomena are termed information
externalities.23 Technological experimentation through research and development
and the inquisitive process of entrepreneurship involve the a process of "selfdiscovery" regarding which economic activities and product lines will be the most
appropriate for a domestic economy. 24 These experimenters who tinker with
establishing or inventing new technologies to adapt to local conditions provide
enormous social value to a national economy but solely bear the course of failure
(and success). 25
These entrepreneurs need to be compensated for their
experimental nature through subsidization of exports and credit, temporary tariff
protection, patent rewards, and marketing support. Without such incentives,
entrepreneurs will be more apt to invest in historically profitable industries in the
primary product sectors.26
As hinted earlier, related to coordination and information externalities is that
trade liberalization and comparative advantage tends to produce static gains but
make dynamic gains through technological change more elusive.27 The static
models of the gains from the trade suggest that a country such as Brazil should
dismantle its industrial sector in favor of specializing in soy and meat production,
and that India should de-emphasize services and heavy manufacturing in favor of
textile and apparel specialization.2 8 These models, if deployed twenty years ago
would have told South Korea and China to focus on rice production. However,
following the lead of Japan, the United States, and Europe before them, many
nations in East Asia and Latin America fostered more diversified and higher value
added sectors over time. 29 Thirty-five years ago if South Korea and China had

21. Id. at 88.
22. See Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Industrialization and the Big Push,

97(5) J. OF POL. ECON. 1003, 1025 (1989); John Weiss, Export Growth and IndustrialPolicy: Lessons
from the East Asian Miracle Experience, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE, Discussion Paper No.
26, at 10, 21, 23, Feb. 2005, http://www.adbi.org/files/2005.02.dp26.eastasia.govt.policy.pdf.
23. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 104-7 (2007).
24. Id. at 105.

25. Id.
26. See ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
127 (1966); HIRSCHMAN, supranote 5, at 183-201; KRUGMAN, supra note 5, at 53.
27. Frank Ackerman & Kevin P. Gallagher, The Shrinking Gains from Global Trade

Liberalizationin Computable GeneralEquilibrium Models:A CriticalAssessment, 37 INT'L J. OF POL.
EcoN. 50, 70 (2008), http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/IJPEShrinkingGains.pdf.
28. Id. at 55-56; Kym Anderson & Will Martin, Agriculture Trade Reform and the Doha
Development Agenda, 28 WORLD BANK 1319, 1319-24 (2005)..
29. HA JooN CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 60-61 (2002) [hereinafter CHANG]; DANIEL OKIMOTO, BETWEEN MITI AND THE
MARKET: JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY 51 (1989).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

318

VOL. 3 8:2

relied on comparative advantage we might not be driving Kias and Hyundais,
using Haier appliances or typing on Lenovo laptops.
In enabling the technological capacity of new industries, markets do not give
the correct investment signals when there are high and uncertain learning costs and
high levels of pecuniary externalities.30 In other words, technological dynamism
that leads to diversification is not guaranteed by market reforms alone. For many
of the reasons described earlier: weak capital markets, restrictive intellectual
property laws, lack of information, and poor coordination, imperfect competition
and the need for scale economies, under-investment in technologically dynamic
sectors can occur.31 Historically, to correct for these market failures nations have
encouraged joint venturing with technological transfer agreements with foreign
firms to learn technological capabilities, in addition they have invested heavily in
higher education and publicly funded research and development.32 What is more,
nations have selectively loosened intellectual property rules to allow for learning
and supported innovative firms through government procurement, export subsidies,
subsidized capital, and tariff protection.33
Although mentioned in each of these previous examples, human capital
formation is also essential for dynamic economic growth and diversification.34
Once again, private markets fall short of supplying human capital at a socially
optimal level. There are numerous arguments why markets undersupply education
and that govermments should intervene to increase the supply of educated workers.
Basic literacy and education have positive externalities such as improved health
and better participation in democratic processes-in other words the social rate of
return on education is higher than personal investment.35 With respect to learning
in private firms, firms may under-invest in the training of their workers because of
fears of high labor turnover. 36 East Asian tigers-like developed countries before
them-spent a great deal of effort providing education and training to their
people.37 This was done by spending a significant amount of funds on education
(including providing scholarships to obtain PhDs in developed countries),
30. Pecuniary externalities affect third parties through price fluctuations but not necessarily
through the misallocation of resources.
31. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 255 (1982); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implicationsof Learning by Doing, 29 REV. OF

ECON. STUD. 155 (1962); Sanjaya Lall, Rethinking IndustrialStrategy: The Role of the State in the Face
of Globalization, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO
AND IFIs 33, 59 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005).
32. AMSDEN, supra note 1, at 239.

33. Id. at 148; CHANG, supranote 29, at 60-61.
34. GENE N. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 122-23 (1991).
35. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).

36. Dani Rodrik, Conceptual Issues in the Design of Trade Policy for Industrialization, 20
WORLDDEV'T 309,310(1992).

37. Sanjaya Lall, Technological Change and Industrializationin the Asian Newly Industrializing
Economies: Achievements and Challenges, in TECHNOLOGY, LEARNING, AND INNOVATION:
EXPERIENCES OF NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 13, 41-46 (Linsu Kim & Richard Nelson eds.,

2000) [hereinafter Kim & Nelson].
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clustering schools in export processing zones, requiring that foreign firms hire
nationals and train them on the job, and subsidizing training programs in domestic
firms. 38 Table 1 exhibits an illustrative but far from exhaustive list of trade and
industrial policies used by East Asian and other developing economies over a 40
year period and the market failures such policies address. It is this list of policies
that will be expanded upon and analyzed in the following section.
Table 1. Tools for Correcting Market FailureS39
Market Failure
Policy Instrument
Coordination Failures
Tariff sequencing
Tax drawbacks
Infrastructure provision
Information externalities
Administrative guidance
Subsidized credit/entrepreneurship
Tariff sequencing
Patent restrictions
Scale
economies/ Tariff sequencing
technological dynamism
Technology transfer requirements
Joint Ventures
Public research and development
Compulsory licensing
Patent restrictions
Government procurement 40
Human capital formation
Public education
Local labor requirements
Movement of people
B. Getting the PoliticalEconomy Right
Some countries have been fairly successful at deploying policies to create
dynamic comparative advantages and to correct for market failures. In the
developing world, the recent standouts are Taiwan, South Korea and more recently
China. Table 2 exhibits average annual growth rates in GDP per capita for
selected regions of the world from 1960 to 2005.
Table 2: Growth in GDP Per Capita for Selected Regions, 1960 to 200541

High Income
East Asia and Pacific
China
Latin America and the Caribbean

38.
39.
40.
industry,
41.

1960-1980
5.7
3.5
3.4
2.9

1980-2005
2.1
6.6
8.6
0.5

2000-2005
2.8
7.2
8.6
1.4

Id. at 58.
Kumar & Gallagher, supranote 16, at 8.
Although countries have used various controls over government procurement to promote local
those measures, for purposes of space and time, remain outside the scope of this paper.
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 196-200 (2008).

320

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

Today's developing nations look to these success stories as possible models
for 2 1st century policy. East Asia experienced 3.5 percent annual per-capita
income growth from 1960 to the 1980 and 6.6 percent since 1980-one of the most
impressive growth trajectories on record.42 What is more, such growth has also
corresponded with reduction in inequality and improvements in many other social
indicators.43 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain in detail the literature
on development in these nations, but experts attribute East Asian growth to four
general categories of policies. 44
Targeted industrial policy with reciprocal control mechanisms where
nations selectively secluded certain industries where they wanted to gain dynamic
comparative advantages;
Loose intellectual property rules where nations encouraged learning from
foreign nations through government R&D efforts and at times reverse engineering
goods from foreign counterparts;
The movement of people across borders for higher education and temporary
work. The best students were sent to the US and Europe to earn degrees in
science, mathematics, and technology then came home to work in targeted
industries or government;
Investment in human capital and public infrastructure where
governments invested heavily in education and provided infrastructure such as
roads, ports, and so forth.
There is considerable debate regarding the extent to which these policies were
the key drivers of growth in some countries. Nevertheless, at this point there is

widespread agreement that these policies did have some positive effect on
economic performance. The debate now centers on what level of effect that was.41
It is not the purpose of this paper to enter that debate. Nor is it the purpose of this
paper to judge the value of those policies for development. Rather, based on the
evidence that such policies have had some positive effect, this paper examines
whether developing countries are still given (or keeping) the choice to deploy them
under existing and proposed trade rules.
Whereas the East Asian nations-such as South Korea and Taiwanmanaged their integration into the world economy through gradual liberalization
and some degree of government involvement, nations in Latin American in the
Caribbean (LAC) rapidly liberalized their economies in a short period of timealong the lines currently being advocated in the Doha Round.46 As we see in Table

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: EcoNOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY 5-7 (1993) [hereinafter World Bank 1993];; Robert Hunter Wade, Is Globalization Reducing
Poverty and Inequality?, 32(4) WORLD DEV'T 567, 567, 580-81 (2004); AMSDEN, supranote 1, at 19394, 238-39;Kim & Nelson, supra note 37, at 1-5 (for useful full length treatments of development in
this region and the use of state policy tools).
45. See WORLD BANK 1993, supra note 44, at 1-6.
46. Id. at 22.
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2 for LAC, income growth since liberalization began in the 1980s has been barely
one percent annually.
Many economists have expressed caution over advising other developing
countries to follow the same path as East Asia.47 First, governments can be
pathetic in picking "winners" for industrial policy. Many governments have tried
to adopt pro-active policies and have failed miserably-in other words, meeting
market failures with government action often leads to government failure. 48
Governments have been criticized for not being able to pick winning sectors to
focus on. Indeed, there are many examples of governments picking "losers."
South Korea and Taiwan are often cited as success stories but Indonesia, Nigeria,
and Brazil have had failures that have received relatively less attention in scholarly
circles.49 In addition, subsidization and government involvement has been shown
to accentuate "rent-seeking" behavior that make it additionally difficult for
developing country governments to let go of projects that aren't going well or that
have already reached maturity. 0
Market failures are not always easy to identify and once they are identified it
isn't just a matter of pulling out a policy toolbox, grabbing a tool from one of these
lists, and hammering away. Indeed, while there is a strong theoretical justification
for pro-active government policy, development success takes much more than the
proper rationale and proper policies. Development success stories from the
twentieth century all struck a unique blend between state and markets-they got
the politicaleconomy of industrialization right.
These critiques are quite valid. Without the proper political economy
conditions, government intervention can create more problems than they correct.
However, the most successful cases in large part circumvented these problems
because governments designed policies where state actors were "embedded" in the
private sector and where the state enforced discipline on the private sector. I refer
to these phenomena as "embedded diagnostics" and "reciprocal control
mechanisms."
By definition, the presence of market failures demonstrates the inability of the
private sector to interpret the signals and trends it faces in the economy. If firms
right in the middle of the marketplace cannot always make the best decisions about
products and processes why should governments make better decisions?
To circumvent the "picking winners" problem, political economists have
shown that successful industrializers have had states that were "embedded" in the
47. See id at 367; MARCUs NOLAND & HowARD PACK, INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: LESSONS FROM ASIA, 77-83 (2003).
48. Id.
49. See generally J. BURTON, PICKING LOSERS..."? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY (1983); PETER EvANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
60-70 (1995).
50. ANN KRUEGER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE PROTECTION 13 (1996). [ALTERNATE
CITATION: Ann Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64(3) Am. Econ. Rev.
291 (1974).]
51. BURTON, supranote 49, at 7.
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private sector while maintaining "autonomy" from sectional elite interests seeking
rents.52 State agencies that are charged with correcting market failures have to
maintain constant communication and input with the private sector.53 Such publicprivate partnerships help both the private and public sectors "discover" what the
most pertinent market failures and other impediments to industrial development are
in an economy, and what assets there are in the economy that can be built upon,
and to pick activities that will have the largest economy-wide effects. 54
Having a good toolkit and embedded autonomy is still not enough. In fact,
public-private partnerships could become marriages of corruption and rentseeking. Successful industrial policy has also tamed the tendency of rent seeking.
In order for this to work, industrial policy has to be coupled with a good deal of
discipline and accountability for both private actors and the state. Alice Amsden
has referred to the need for "reciprocal control mechanisms."
A control
mechanism is "a set of institutions that disciplines economic behavior based on a
feedback of information that has been sensed and assessed." 56 For the East Asian
success stories, the key principle behind their use of control mechanisms was
"reciprocity":
Reciprocity disciplined subsidy recipients and thereby minimized
government failures. Subsidies were allocated to make manufacturing
profitable-to convert moneylenders into financiers and importers into
industrialists-but did not become giveaways. Recipients of subsidies
were subjected to monitorable performance standards that were
redistributive in nature and result-oriented. The reciprocal control
mechanism thus transformed the inefficiency and venality associated

with government intervention into collective good.5 7
In other words, firms have performance requirements that when they are not
met lead to a termination of supporting benefits by the state. The most successful

industrializers were able to abandon projects that were not performing whereas
others where perpetuated because bureaucrats became hijacked by business
interests who became dependent on the state. Since public policy may make a
difference in development, and, in fact, has been used successfully by some

developing nations to increase diversification and related growth, it is important to
understand the extent to which such policy space exists today.
II. TESTING FOR POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO AND BEYOND

Of the historical tools for diversity and development, which ones remain
available under the new global trading regime? Do bilateral and regional

52. See EVANS, supranote 49, at 4-20.
53. Id. at 81-83.
54. See DANI RODRIK, COMM'N ON GROWTH & DEV., NORMALIZING INDUSTRIAL POLICY 20-22

(2008), http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/RodrickNormalizing.pdf.
55. AMSDEN, supra note 1, at 8-11.
56. Alice Amsden, PromotingIndustry Under WTO Law, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE
IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO AND IFIS 216, 221-22 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005).

57. Id. at 222.
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agreements further limit policy space for development? This paper examines four
trade-related areas (goods, services, investment and intellectual property) across
three agreement models. By comparing US-style, EU-style and South-South
agreements with the WTO trade disciplines we determine to what extent the
various regimes constrain policy space for member nations. In so doing we draw
important lessons from the different trade agreement models and evaluate which
are best for the purposes of promoting sustainable development in the long-run.
Table 3. Illustrative Tool Box Flexibilities
Policy Instrument

WTO&
Associated US
AgreementS59
Agree
ments

EU
Agree
mentS

South-South
Agreements
60

Tariff sequencing
Tax export incentives
"Non-tariff barriers" in X

X

X

services
Movement of natural
persons
Public education
Local

labor

requirements

Technology transfer
Domestic content61

Infrastructure
provision
Administrative
guidance
Subsidized
credit/entrepreneurship

58. As a caveat before going forward, the agreements within each trade regime are by no means
homogenous. Within each of the principal trade areas, the regimes contain some measure of variation.
This paper attempts to draw some generalizations about disciplines under each trade regime. Where the
agreements significantly depart from each other, however, the difference is noted.
59. As with all measures under the WTO, even permitted policies are subject to the two pillars to
the WTO: non-discrimination and national treatment. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I,
III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT.
60. These South-South arrangements are by far the least uniform. Thus, the designations in this
column represent generalizations from the later analysis.

61. This and other policies may be permitted despite violating certain WTO rules if they pass as
legitimate public welfare regulations. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, art. 63, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1221 (1994).
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Patent restrictions by
origin/industry/duration
Compulsory licensing
Table 3 expands the illustrative list of development policy tools in Table 1 in
the first column and then indicates whether such policies are permitted under
various trading arrangements. A "4" signifies that yes the measure is permitted; an
"x" denotes that a measure is not permitted. We go into this table in great detail
below, but an initial examination reveals that some models provide considerably
more policy space for member countries.
Policy space also varies across issue areas. In the following pages, we first
discuss the role that bilateral and regional agreements play within the multilateral
trading system. We then examine the policy space available in each of four issues:
trade in goods, trade in services, investment protection and intellectual property.
Although the agreement models are by no means homogenous, we hope to draw
some general conclusions about which trade agreements best promote long-term
development.
A. BilateralAgreements in the MultilateralSystem
Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
1947, member countries have attempted to establish a baseline of liberalization for
global trade in goods. The creation of the World Trade Organization in 1994
expanded that vision to cover trade in services, intellectual property, and a host of
other sub-issues related to trade.62 Alongside of the multilateral trading system,
countries have clamored to sign bilateral and regional accords, broadening and
deepening their commitments to trade liberalization.63 For that reason, most
(though not all) free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) exceed
the disciplines of the WTO.
The most favored nation (MFN) clause, requiring that WTO members treat all
other members as their most favored trade partner,64 would seem to make bilateral
agreements moot. However, Article XXIV of the GATT, as well as Article V of
the GATS make room for these agreements so long as they liberalize "substantially
all" trade in goods and services.65 By fully liberalizing trade between partners,

62. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

WTO LEGAL TExTS (1994),

available at http://www

.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/legal e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
63. Theresa Carpenter, A historicalperspective on regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZING
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM. 13, 23 (Richard Baldwin and Patrick

Low eds., 2009).
64. GATT supra note 59, at art. I.
65. GATT supra note 59, at art. XXIV (defining customs unions and free trade areas as a group of
countries in which tariffs and other restrictive measures "are eliminated on substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories"); General Agreement on Trade in Services art. V, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments Results ofthe Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (permitting bilateral services
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proponents of the multilateral trading system hope that the agreements will act as
building blocks toward multilateral free trade.
WTO oversight has met with very limited success, however. Of the hundreds
of agreements notified, only one has ever been deemed to meet the terms of
Articles XXIV and V. 66 Still, most agreements do exceed the WTO in both
breadth and depth. US-style agreements, traditionally the most uniform and
comprehensive model, govern everything from goods and services trade to
investment protection, intellectual property, and domestic regulation among
others. 67 EU-style agreements tend to depend more on the trading partner. While
EU-Chile, EU-Mexico and the more recent EU-CARIFORUM agreements
resemble the US model, 68 EU-South Africa and EU-Tunisia cover less ground,
omitting such issues as financial services, electronic commerce, and labor and the
69
environment.

agreements provided they have "substantial sectoral coverage" and eliminate "substantially all
discrimination ... between or among the parties").
66. Roberto V. Fiorentino, Jo-Ann Crawford and Christelle Toqueboeuf, The landscape of
regional trade agreements and WTO surveillance, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 28, 35 (Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low, 2009).

67. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic - Central America FTA) Final Text, Aug. 5,
2004, Office of the United States Trade Representative [hereinafter USTR], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-centralamerica-fta/final-text [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]; North American Free Trade Agreement, May, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 605, NAFTA Secretariat, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343
[hereinafter NAFTA]; Chile FTA Final Text, June 6, 2003, USTR, available at
http://ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html
[hereinafter
US-Chile]; Singapore
FTA
Final
Text, May
6,
2003,
USTR,
available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/FinalTexts/asset upload file708 4
036.pdf [hereinafter US-Singapore].
68. Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member
States, of one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, Nov. 11, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 352),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc 11 1620.pdf
[hereinafter
EU-Chile];
Decision No 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 - Joint Declarations Title VI,
Mar. 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 157) 10, 25 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/ oj/dat/2000/1 157/1
15720000630en00100028.pdf [hereinafter EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000]; Decision No 2/2001 of the
EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 Feb. 2001 - implementing Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) and 50 of the
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, Feb.. 27, 2001, 2001 O.J. (L
70) 7, www.sice.org/Trade/mex eu/English/ DecisionsCouncil/2 2001 e.pdf [hereinafter EU-Mexico
Decision 2/2001]; Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part,
and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, CARIFORUM-E.U., Oct. 30,
2008,
2008
O.J.
(L
289/I)
3, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2
008/february/tradoc 137971.pdf [hereinafter EU-CARJFORUM].
69. Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, E.U.-S. Afr.,
Dec. 4, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 311) 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:1999:311:0003: 0297:EN:PDF [hereinafter EU-S.A.], and Euro-Mediterranean Agreement
establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one
part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, E.U.-Tunis., Mar. 30, 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 097) 2,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127986.pdf [hereinafter EUTunisia].
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The 1979 GATT decision on "differential and more favorable treatment" (the
"Enabling Clause") makes more room for lesser developed countries to sign
bilateral accords without demanding reciprocity or liberalization of "substantially
all" trade, as Article XXIV requires. Today, many developing countries enter into
FTAs and CUs under the Enabling Clause in order to retain extra flexibility in
complying with WTO standards. In part for that reason, many South-South
agreements seem skeletal in comparison with the north-south models. The South
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), for example, effectively contains
commitments only in the area of goods trade.
On the other hand, the Southern
Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community (CAN) cover
as many issues as some EU agreements. Still, broader issue coverage does not
always signify deeper trade commitments. Likewise, depth of coverage within
these agreements can act as much to protect developing economies from the
outside as to liberalize within. In the next pages, we explore how differences in
agreement breadth and depth affect the policy flexibility that countries enjoy
within the global trading system.

70. Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, Jan. 6, 2004, available at www.saarcsec.org/data/agenda/.../safta/ SAFTAo2OAGREEMENT.pdf [hereinafter SAFTA].
71. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the
Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay Annex I,
Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1050, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsr7.asp
[hereinafter MERCOSUR Goods]; Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services of MERCOSUR, Dec. 15,
1997,
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
of
Brazil,
available
at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/relinter/ingles/mercosul/montv-e.asp [hereinafter MERCOSUR Services];
Protocol on Harmonization of Norms on Intellectual Property in MERCOSUR in Matters of
Trademarks, Indications of Source and Appellations of Origin, Aug. 5, 1995, 2145 U.N.T.S. 460,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/12/10/5009.pdf [hereinafter MERCOSUR
IPRs]; Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in
MERCOSUR, Jan. 17, 1994, Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil, available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/relinter/ingles/mercosul/coloni-e.asp
[hereinafter
MERCOSUR
Investment]; Treaty of Asunci6n Annex IV, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1059, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrl1.asp
[hereinafter
MERCOSUR Safeguards]; The
Commission of the Andean Community, Decision 563: Official Codified Text of the Andean
Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), June 25, 2003, Andean Community,
available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D563e.htm
[hereinafter Cartagena
Agreement]; The Commission of the Andean Community, Decision 486: Common IntellectualProperty
Regime, Sept. 14, 2000, Andean Community, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/
ingles/normativa/D486e.htn [hereinafter CAN IPRs]; The Commission of the Andean Community,
Decision 439: GeneralFramework ofPrinciplesand Rules andfor Liberalizingthe Trade in Services in
the
Andean Community,
June
11,
1998,
Andean
Community,
available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D439e.htm
[hereinafter CAN Services]; The
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision 292: Rigimen Uniforme para Empresas
Multinacionales Andinas,
Mar.
21,
1991,
Andean
Community,
available
at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d292.HTM [hereinafter CAN Andean Business]; The
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision 291: Rigimen Comain de Tratamiento a los
Capitales Extranjeros y so-bre Marcas, Patentes, Licencias y Regalias, Mar. 21, 1991, Andean
Community, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d291.HTM [hereinafter CAN
Foreign Investment].
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B. Goods Trade Policies
Countries have employed many policies affecting trade in goods to promote
growth and development. Here we explore the flexibilities still available to
member countries under bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements, looking
specifically at tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, export incentives and safeguards.
Table 4 provides a brief overview of the policy space available under the WTO
and two North-South trade agreement models.
Table 4. Goods Checklist
Policy Instrument

WTO
& US
EU
Associated
Agreements Agreements
Agreements

Tariffs
Quantitative Restrictions/Licensing
Tax Drawbacks/Deferrals and EPZs
Safeguards for injurious imports and

balance of payments72
Safeguards for shortages 73
1. Tariffs
Tariffs have long been the preferred trade barriers under the WTO and its
predecessor and underlying agreement, the GATT because they are easy to
measure, transparent to apply, and straightforward to liberalize progressively over
time. Employed carefully, countries can raise and lower tariffs to protect nascent
industries until they are ready to face global competition.74 The WTO implicitly
permits such measures, allowing countries to bind their tariff rates at or below the
current applied rates - giving little or no room for adjustments upward. 5 Table 5
provides an example, comparing bound and applied rates for photographic paper in
rolls wider than 610 mm. 76
72. The degree of procedural requirements varies greatly between agreements. See EU-Chile,
supranote 62, at arts. 92, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supranote 62, at arts. 15, 21.
73. Among US and EU disciplines, the rules are not identical across agreements.
74. CHANG, supranote 29, at 66.
75. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CHILE: TARIFF PROFILE, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tariffs e/tariff rofiles 2006 e/chl e.pdf (May 15, 2006). Take,
for example, Chile's tariff profile as provided by the WTO. While the simple average bound is 25.1%,
the simple average applied is much lower at 6%. This trend repeats for the countries in this study.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CURRENT SITUATIONS OF SCHEDULES OF WTO MEMBERS (Mar. 17,
2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/schedules e/goods schedules table e.htm
(May 15, 2006) [hereinafter WTO CURRENT SCHEDULES].
76. This trend repeats itself over and over again in the countries' individual tariff schedules.
Taking a simple average of the bound rates under the RTAs and comparing it to the simple average of
the MFN applied rate across all products would prove this conclusively. Unfortunately, we were unable
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Table 5. Illustrative Tariff Comparison: Photographic paper, in rolls wider
than 610 mm (%)

Country/Agreement

WTO
binding77

Bilateral
Agreement
binding

MFN
applied
rate (avg)78

Chile: US and EU79

25.0

6.0

6.0

35.0

0.081

11.5

45.0

10.0

9.0

Nicaragua: DR-CAFTA 83

40.0

5.0

10.0

Honduras: DR-CAFTA 84

35.0

10.0

10.0

45.0

10.0

10.0

8.0

8.0

6.5

0.0

0.0

EU-Tunisia

38.0

0.0

15.0

EU-South Africa 89

15.0

0.0

5.0

Mexico: US and EUs0
Costa Rica: DR-CAFTA

82

85

Guatemala: DR-CAFTA
Dominican
CAFTA 86

Republic:

US-Singapore87
88

DR- 35.0

to find a schedules document that would export to a spreadsheet program and take such averages.
77. WTO CURRENT SCHEDULES, supranote 92.
78. Id.
79. EU-Chile, supranote 62; See US-Chile, supranote 67, at annex 3.3
80. EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supra note 62; NAFTA, supra note 67.
81. This represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over seven years. NAFTA, supra
note 67.
82. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Costa Rica), 56 (HS8 37031000).
83. DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Nicaragua), 54 (HS8
370231000).
84. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Honduras), 63 (HS8 37031000).
85. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Guatemala), 56 (HS8 37031000).
86. DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of the Dominican Republic), 66
(HS8 37031000).
87. US-Singapore, supra note 67. To many, Singapore no longer counts as a developing country,
though it was once a Newly Industrializing Country that employed many of these policies. We chose
the US-Singapore agreement to provide some geographical variation and contrast to the Latin American
agreements with the US.
88. The FTA binding represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over five years. EUTunisia, supranote 63, at art. 11, annex 3.
89. The FTA binding represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over five years. EUS.A., supra note 63, at art. 12.
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2. Non-tariff barriers
In addition to tariffs, countries have employed other trade restrictions (nontariff barriers or NTBs) to protect domestic industry and promote development.
Unlike tariffs, however, all modem trading regimes strongly disapprove of NTBs,
generally prohibiting quantitative restrictions (quotas), import licensing, and
import and export price requirements. 90 Under the WTO, however, countries may
introduce NTBs to address food shortages and balance of payments difficulties, or
enforce certain local standards and regulations. 91
EU-style agreements generally mimic WTO standards and incorporate both
the balance of payments and shortages exceptions for imposing NTBs. 92 Still, EU
treaty language tends to vary with the treaty partner. EU-CARIFORUM, for
example, contains an exception for balance of payments difficulties, but none for
shortages. 93 Meanwhile, EU-Tunisia and EU-South Africa expressly prohibit only
quotas. 94 US-style agreements likewise mirror the WTO standard for NTBs. Few
US-style FTAs, however, make the same room for exceptional circumstances.
Only one of six treaty partners under DR-CAFTA retained a shortages exception,
and most recent agreements have eliminated the exception for balance of
payments .
3. Incentives for export
Another way countries have encouraged development is through export
incentive programs to reward companies, industries and even regions for export
performance.96 Taking the form of duty drawbacks, tax deferrals and export
processing zones (EPZs), these measures can promote a healthy trade balance and
enable local industry to compete globally.97 The WTO places no restraints on
export incentive policies ad seems to prefer them to more direct subsidy

90. See Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agriculture
Agreement and its Implicationsfor the DOHA Round, 79 N.D. L. Rev. 691, 732 (2003).
91. GATT, supra note 59, at art. XII; see infra Section II.B.4. (discussing the availability of
safeguard measures). The WTO treats import licenses as quotas, and has a separate annex governing the
use of licenses in cases where they are permitted. See Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Import
Licensing].
92. EU-Chile, supranote 62, at art. 76; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supra note 62, at art. 12.
93. EU-CARIFORUM, supranote 62, at art. 240.
94. EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 19; EU-Tunisia, supranote 63, at art. 19.
95. US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 3.11(2); DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 3.8(2). DRCAFTA also expressly incorporates the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing, and imposes an
additional notification requirement. Id. at art. 3.9. However, neither NAFTA, US-Singapore, US-Peru,
nor US-Colombia have any exceptions for balance of payments difficulties or shortages.
96. See generally Bela Balassa, Export incentives and export performance in developing
countries: A comparative analysis, 14(1) REV. OF WORLD EcON. 24 (1978). Export incentives based on
geography are often called Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The International Labour Organization,
InFocus Initiative on Export Processing Zones, Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.ilo.org/public/english
/dialogue/sector/themes/epz.htm.
97. See Balassa,supra note 77.
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programs.98 Likewise, EU agreements incorporate the WTO standard here,
omitting explicit discipline on the subject.99
The US model, on the other hand, almost universally prohibits such
incentives. 00 Under NAFTA, member states may not provide drawbacks or tax
deferrals on condition that goods are exported or used as material for another
exported good.101 US-Chile and DR-CAFTA, also prohibit new or continuing
duties waivers based on certain "performance requirements," which include export
level or percentage requirements as well as other production performance

measures.102
4. Safeguards
Despite the current controversy surrounding the Special Safeguard
Mechanism for agriculture at Doha, the WTO actually retains a fair amount of
safeguard flexibility for by countries facing sudden injurious levels of imports,
balance of payments difficulties, and critical food shortages.Under the WTO,
countries may address these problems temporarily by imposing NTBs, suspending
tariff concessions or raising tariff rates. 103
Based largely on the WTO model, EU agreements provide the same
flexibilities for countries addressing harmful levels of imports, balance of

98. Yung Whee Rhee, Instrumentsfor Export Policy and Administration: Lessons from the East
Asian Experience 79 (World Bank Staff, Working Paper No. 725, 1985) quoting BELA BALASSA,
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES 72 (1982), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/07/08/000178830_981019034
31389/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Rhee implies that, export subsidies, unlike duty drawbacks and
deferrals, are categorically prohibited under each of these regimes. Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994);
DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 3.14; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 3.16; NAFTA, supra note 67,
at art. 705. Mexico's maquiladora program provides a ready example of such a system. Under
NAFTA, however, "maquila firms were granted a seven-year phase-in period during which they
continued to enjoy duty-free importation benefits." This ended in January, 2001, when NAFTA article
303 entered into effect. John Sargent & Linda Matthews,Combining Export Processing Zones and
Regional Free Trade Agreements: Lessons From the Mexican Experience, 29(10) WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1739, 1741 (2001) [hereinafter Sargent & Matthews].
99. Several EU-style treaties prohibit the use of taxation to protect domestic industry, which could
indirectly restrict tax-based export incentives. EU-Chile supra note 62, at art. 63; EU-Mexico Decision
2/2000 supra note 62, at art. 13; EU-CARIFORUM supra note 62 at art. 13. By contrast, EU
agreements with several African nations implicitly permit drawbacks by limiting the amount to that of
the original tax. EU-Tunisia supra note 63, at art. 22; EU-S.A. supra note 63, at art. 21. This
provisions seems to be aimed at preventing hidden export subsidies - payments called "drawbacks" or
"deferrals" by the government, but which actually exceed the amount of the tax.
100. The one exception here is US-Singapore. NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 303; US-Chile,
supranote 67, at art. 3.8; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 3.4.
101. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 303.
102. This does not include conditions, however, that the good be subsequently exported and other
such rules as required under NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 303.1. US-Chile, supranote 67, at art. 3.24;
DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 3.31.
103. GATT, supra note 59 at arts. XII: 1, XIX: 1(a).
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payments difficulties and, in some cases, shortages. 104 Taking it a step further to
promote development, some EU treaties also permit transitional safeguards, which
may be imposed solely to protect infant industry.1 05
Once more, US agreements close in on the policy space otherwise available,
not allowing safeguard measures in the case of shortages.106 The agreements also
do not allow countries to introduce new NTBs as safeguard measures and they
require that, in the case of injury by imports, the imports not only cause serious
injury or threatthereof(GATT language), but that they be the substantialcause of
that injury-a higher legal standard.10 7
5. North-south models and south-south responses
North-south trade agreements generally constrain policy space more tightly
than the WTO and its associated agreements. However, some developing
countries have begun to make their own room for public policy by joining together
to form south-south trading blocs that leave open even more policy options for
diversification and development. Some South-South agreements, for example,
allow member countries wholesale exceptions to the general liberalization
program. These "sensitive lists" are often safe from both tariff concessions and the
elimination of NTBs. 108 Furthermore, by excluding certain issues, such as tax,
from the agreement terms, South-South arrangements make room for members to
provide export and other incentives. 109
Notably, these agreements disfavor safeguards except in "exceptional cases"
and limit their use to situations with injurious levels of imports. Lesser-developed
countries seem to worry that industrialized trade partners would use safeguards
against them, injuring their exports. SAFTA hints at this concern by making a

104. The EU agreements in Latin America allow safeguards in all three of these cases. EU-Chile,
supra note 62, at arts. 92, 93, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supra note 62, at arts. 15, 16, 21. The
EU agreements with Tunisia and South Africa, however circumscribe the application of safeguards
somewhat more. EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at arts. 25-26 (excluding express safeguards for balance of
payments); EU-S.A., supra note 63, at arts. 24, 26 (no allowance for goods trade safeguards for balance
of payments difficulties or shortages). EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at arts. 25, 240 (making no
room for safeguards for shortages).
105. EU-Tunisia, supra note 69, at art. 14; EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 25.
106. Since the agreements mention nothing about shortages, safeguards to protect against them is
presumed prohibited.
107. US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 7.1; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 8.1; DR-CAFTA,
supra note 67, at art. 8.1; NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 801. The only US agreement to take special
consideration of developing countries, DR-CAFTA article 8.1(4), places limitations on imposing
safeguards against developing countries.
108. Both the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR) contain "sensitive lists" within the agreement, and SAFTA even permits countries to
maintain NTBs on such sensitive products. SAFTA, supra note 70, at arts. 7.3, 7.5; MERCOSUR
Goods, supranote 71, at art. 6.
109. Article 101 of the China-Chile Agreement, for example, exempts all tax issues from coverage
by the agreement. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of Chile, Chile-P.R.C., Nov. 18, 2005, Asia Regional Integration
Center, available at http://aric.adb.org/fta.php?id=79&ssid=3&title= People's%20Republic%20of
o20China-Chileo2OFree%20Tradeo20Agreement [hereinafter China-Chile].
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special consideration for lesser-developed members, limiting safeguards against
them. 110
Since 1994, global trade disciplines have increased in scope to cover services
trade regulation, treatment of foreign investment, and intellectual property
protection, among others. The following sections explore these trade-related
policy areas and the extent to which trade agreements impact policymakers'
decisions today.
C. Trade in Services
Since the Uruguay Round, global trade in services has increased drastically.
Some of the fastest growing sectors such as computer-related services, legal
services, and advertising and technical service jobs grew between 70 and 250
percent from 1994 to 2004.111 Of 54 bilateral and regional agreements with
services trade provisions, only five predate the Uruguay round.1 12 Prior to the
formation of the WTO, countries retained substantial freedom in regulating
services trade so long as the measures didn't interfere with goods trade as well.113
Today, however, the new multilateral trading system and bilateral agreements
circumscribe their efforts to varying degrees. Table 6 compares the policy space
available for certain measures affecting services trade. In the following discussion,
we detail the practical constraints that today's trade agreements place on member
country governments.
Table 6. Services Checklist
Policy Instrument

WTO&
Associated
Agreements

US
EU
Agreements Agreements

Control over sensitive sectors1 14
"Non-tariff barriers in Services
Duty of establishment
Withholding
establishment

right

Domestic regulation

of

16

110. SAFTA, supra note 64, at art. 16.8.
111. OSHANI PERERA, THE GLOBALISATION OF SERVICES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 3 (International Institute for

Sustainable Development 2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/globalisation-services-sd.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. While some amount of control is permitted under all agreements, US agreements employ a
negative list rather than the positive list approach of the GATS and EU agreements.
115. Here, the EU agreements could be evolving to look more like US agreements but the rules are
not consistent across the four treaties.
116. The difference here is that the balancing test for regulations is self-enforcing under the EU
and US agreements, while enforcement under the WTO requires further rulemaking.
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Movement of natural persons
Investments in public education4
1. Sensitive sectors
Many countries have retained control over sensitive sectors such as "essential
services, network infrastructure services, and financial services" within their
economy in order to promote economic stability.1 17 Theoretically, countries may
continue to protect these sectors under any FTA through the negotiation process.
However, the process differs significantly depending on the trade agreement
model. The WTO adopts what has been called a "positive-list approach," meaning
that protection is the rule rather than the exception.1 18 Thus, unless the country
specifically commits a sector, it remains unbound. The WTO's General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also permits lesser developed countries
(LDCs) to liberalize later and carve out public services from coverage so that they
are not bound by the rules of the agreement.1 19
Like the GATS, EU agreements have adopted a positive-list
approach. 12 0Some EU agreements pronounce a general standstill on future
measures inconsistent with liberalization, indirectly binding even unbound sectors.
However, recent agreements such as EU-CARIFORUM do not contain such a
clause, indicating that standstill provisions may not become a permanent trend in
EU-style treaties. 12 1 The pivotal difference between the US model and GATSbased models is found in the negative list approach to liberalization - making
protection the exception rather than the rule. 122 Practically speaking, this means
117. ACTIONAID, CHRISTIAN AID & OXFAM, EU FTA MANUAL, BRIEFING 4: THE EU's APPROACH
To FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: SERVICES 2 (Feb. 2008), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/

policy/trade/downloads/fta4_services.pdf [hereinafter Oxfan Services].
118. MARIO MARCONINI, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SERVICES
TRADE 12 (ICTSD Policy Paper on Trade in Services and Sustainable Development (Draft) 2006),
http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2006-02-28/marconini.pdf.
119. GATS, supra note 65, at arts. IV, XIX (demanding "appropriate flexibility for individual
countries Members for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, progressively
extending market access in line with their development situation and, when making access to their
markets available to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access conditions aimed at acheiveing
the objectives referred to in Article IV."); Id. at art. I, para. 3 (excluding "services supplied in the
exercise of governmental authority" from coverage). It is important to note, however, that the WTO
contains inherently the expectation of full liberalization across sectors eventually. Id. at Annex on
Article II Exemptions.
120. Although the four EU agreements studied here contain actual services commitments only to
varying degrees, each contains a reference to the positive list approach stated in their negotiating
mandate at the very least. EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 7; EU-Chile, supra note
62, at art. 99; EU- S.A., supranote 63, at art. 29.1; EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at art. 32.1. And like the
WTO, with the exception of EU-Tunisia, these agreements call for the eventual elimination of
"substantially all remaining discrimination between the parties" in all sectors and all modes of supply.
EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 7; EU-Chile, supra note 62, at art. 100; EU-S.A.,
supranote 63, at art. 30.1.
121. Oxfan Services, supra note 117, at 5; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at arts. 5,
7.
122. Marconini, supranote 118, at 12.
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that countries must negotiate for every sector they want to protect - a highly
negotiation intensive process.
In theory, US agreements permit countries to make reservations to the MEN
principle, to reserve room for future measures that are inconsistent with
liberalization, and to protect whole sectors from the agreement. These options
seem unavailable under an EU or WTO framework. 123 Both EU-style agreements
and the GATS expect eventual full liberalization across sectors. 124 If such
comprehensive liberalization results, developing countries that seek multilateral or
EU-style trade preferences for the policy flexibility they provide may end up with
more restraints than they bargained for, twenty or thirty years down the road.
2. "Non-Tariff Barriers" in Services: quota equivalents for services trade
Just as in goods trade, countries have introduced quantitative and qualitative
restrictions on trade in services to promote domestic industry and control the
behavior of service suppliers. For the most part, these measures are no longer
permitted under any international trading regime. GATS provides a template for
such restrictions, prohibiting service supplier quotas, transaction or asset
restrictions, output quotas, employment limitations,
organization-type
requirements (such as joint ventures) and limitations on foreign capital
participation by any means.1250nly in sectors where countries did not undertake
market access commitments do they have policy flexibility. The same applies to
US and EU-style agreements. Some employ GATS-equivalent language (EUChile, EU-Mexico, EU-CARIFORUM, US agreements), 126 while others simply
incorporate the terms of GATS by reference (EU-Tunisia, EU-S.A.). 127
Two differences stand out between the trade agreement models, however: the
binding approach and the type of agreement coverage. As mentioned above, under
the GATS and EU treaties, countries must specifically bind sectors to market
access rules, while the US model binds all sectors except those expressly excluded.
More importantly, the US model regulates foreign capital participation and joint
ventures under the investment chapter rather than the services section of the
agreement. Since the investment chapter is not sector-specific, it binds even more
broadly than the US's negative list approach to service commitments. 12 8
123. Id. at 8; NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 1206; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.6; USChile, supra note 67, at art. 11.6; US-Singapore, supranote 67, at art. 8.7.
124. GATS, supranote 65, at Annex on Article II Exemptions.
125. GATS, supra note 65, art. XVI (prohibiting two other measures: requiring a certain
organization type for service suppliers and foreign capital participation limits - both of which will be
addressed in the coming sections).
126. EU-Chile, supranote 62, at art. 97; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supranote 62, at art. 4; DRCAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.4; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 11.4; US-Singapore, supranote 67,
at art. 8.5. The exception to many of these rules is NAFTA, since it came about so much earlier - on
this subject it states: "The Parties shall periodically, but in any event at least every two years, endeavor
to negotiate the liberalization or removal of the quantitative restrictions set out in Annex V pursuant to
paragraphs 1 through 3." NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 1207, 14.
127. EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 29, 1; EU-Tunisia, supranote 63, at art. 32, 1.
128. Restricting foreign capital participation may also be prohibited through maintaining the right
of establishment, present in all US agreements and discussed below.
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3. Duties and rights of establishment
Policy makers have also introduced policies influencing establishment rights
to control the quantity and quality of service suppliers. A duty of establishment,129
forces service suppliers to establish a local place of business or become a resident
in order to provide their service.130 By contrast, a "right of establishment"
provides foreign services suppliers with a presumptive right to establish
themselves in the partner countries.
The text of the GATS mentions neither a duty nor a right of establishment for
foreigners. At the same time, specific commitments by some countries maintain a
duty of establishment in certain sectors. In bound sectors, such measures would
likely have to be set out in the schedule for continued liberalization.131 EU-style
agreements look much like the GATS with regard to maintaining an establishment
duty; however, they vary widely in their treatment of establishment rights.132 EUChile, for example, mandates national treatment with respect to establishment, for
both legal and natural persons of agreement partners1 33 The agreement with
Mexico provides an express right of establishment for financial service suppliers
only. 134 Meanwhile, EU-CARIFORUM carves out a narrow right of establishment
for maritime services. 135
Unlike the GATS and EU agreement models, the establishment commitments
in US agreements are neither sector- nor partner-specific. Countries that partner
with the US may not impose any duties on foreign services suppliers or investors
to establish a local commercial presence. 136 Likewise, they must extend a
universal right of establishment to all US legal entities who desire entry into their
country.137 The standardized US approach, therefore, allows little wiggle room for
countries seeking policy options for development.
4. Domestic regulation
Possibly one of the most domestically invasive and yet universally accepted
provisions in trade agreements addresses the issues of domestic regulation of
service suppliers.As countries have expressed concern that their trading partners
129. Also known as the "right of non-establishment."
130. NAFTA, supranote 67, art. 1205.
131. Marconini, supra note 118, at 9.
132. Oxfam Services, supra note 117, at 3.
133. EU-Chile, supranote 62, art. 132.
134. EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, art. 12.
135. EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at art. 109(5). The agreement also indirectly refers to
"establishment" in Article 224 on General Exceptions, however, the context would indicate that the
word means "direct investment" rather than any general right of establishment. Id. at art. 224(1)
("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination .
or a disguised restriction on trade in goods,
services or establishment. . .").
136. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1205; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.5; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 11.5; US-Singapore, supranote 67, at art. 8.6. One author mentions that while the US
agreements contain clearer language about the prohibition of duty of establishment clauses, they may
not necessarily be "more forceful in actually putting them into effect." Marconini, supra note 118, at 9.
137. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 10.3 (emphasis added).
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would use regulation as veiled discrimination, the GATS, followed by regional and
bilateral agreements, imposes some limits on the use of domestic regulation.
The GATS spells out the universal standard for balancing legitimate
regulation with trade liberalization: that general policy measures are administered
reasonably, objectively and impartially manner, that the regulations are based on
"objective and transparent criteria, ... not more burdensome than necessary ...
[and] not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service." 38 EU and USstyle agreements mirror that same standard while stepping up the binding nature of
that standard. The GATS provision acts only as a basis for future rulemaking by
the Council for Trade in Service, however, the standard in US and some EU
agreements is self-enforcing - the parties must meet those standards or risk
violating the agreement. 139
5. Human Capital Development
The most direct way for countries to improve their services sectors is through
local human capital development. Countries have employed numerous means to
this end, including opening their borders to migration and immigration and
investing heavily in public education. In the case of opening borders, it is the
developing countries that favor liberalization over protection, and the developed
world that resists. Under the GATS, countries may schedule commitments to
remove barriers to migration and immigration. 140 EU-style agreements also allow
for such commitments, but in most cases, the EU offers only minimal liberalization
of their own borders. 141US agreements simply omit border liberalization from the
scope of the services provisions, permitting all kinds of restrictions on th free
movement of persons. 142
International trade agreements rarely interfere with government investments
in public education. Where WTO members recognize the licensing of schools and
teachers of another member, those countries must give other members a chance to
negotiate recognition of their own licensing procedures. 143 However, the WTO
does not require that countries harmonize their domestic licensing standards or
automatically recognize that of other trade partners. Instead, such licensing is
subject to the same standard of reasonableness, objectivity, and impartiality as all
other domestic regulation mentioned in the previous section. 144 The biggest
138. GATS, supranote 65, at art. VI,
1,4.
139. Id. at art. VI, 1 4; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.8; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art.
11.8; US-Singapore, supranote 67, at art. 8.8; EU-Chile, supranote 62, at art. 102; NAFTA, supranote
67, at art. 1210. But see EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 8 (containing only a vague
"regulatory carve out" for parties wishing to regulate service supply). The EU-South Africa and EUTunisia agreements have only a skeletal services section, more of an agreement to agree than a
commitment to liberalize services immediately See, e,g., EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 30; EUTunisia, supranote 63, at art. 31.
140. GATS, supranote 65, at art. VI,
1, 4.
141. E.g., EU-Chile,supra note 62, at art. 95; Oxfam Services, supranote 117, at 5.
142. E.g., DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 11.1.
143. GATS, supranote 65, at art. VII.
144. Consequently, as mentioned above, EU and US agreements maintain the same standard for
such licensing, with potentially stronger enforcement abilities.
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obstacles to public education investments, however, come from the domestic
political and economic situation within the developing countries. Where they have
no money to invest, or where the money is poorly used or inequitably distributed,
countries may not be able to build up their human capital effectively.
6. Services commitments and South-south complacence
Across the board, international agreements in services trade have limited the
policy options available to countries directing public policy toward diversification
and growth. Surprisingly, South-South arrangements have done little to either
preserve or increase policy space in this area. Services commitments are relatively
new in the arena of free trade agreements they are often negotiated once an
agreement on goods is in place. Consequently, many south-south agreements, such
as China-Chile and SAFTA have not yet concluded a section on services, and the
CAN, under Secretariat Decision 439, contains only minimal services
obligations. 145
MERCOSUR's Montevideo Protocol, by far the most comprehensive southsouth services agreement, contains largely GATS-equivalent language, especially
as regards market access commitments.146 As a result, these agreements retain the
flexibilities existent under the WTO and GATS but nothing more. Trade in
services has come to mean, in addition to cross-border trade and movement of
natural persons, the supply of services through commercial presence abroad - also
known as foreign direct investment. 147 Although the WTO and EU frameworks
treat most investment provisions as services disciplines, the US addresses it in a
separate investment chapter that more rigidly constrains the use of domestic
measures to control foreign investors as well as foreign capital. The next section
discusses the various policy limits on foreign investment regulation imposed by
modem trading regimes.
D. Investment
Countries have historically had at their fingertips numerous creatively crafted
investment measures aimed to protect domestic industry, preserve their current and
capital account balances, create local backward and forward linkages, and
otherwise strengthen their economy. These measures address both foreign direct
and portfolio investment - that is, both companies, and capital. Table 7 lays out
the current availability of these measures under trade agreement models.

145. CAN Services, supra note 65, arts. 14-16 (laying a general liberalization process with some
vague commitments).
146. MERCOSUR Services, supranote 65, at art. IV.
147. Designated under the GATS framework as Mode 3. GATS, supranote 65, at art. 1, 12.
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Table 7: Investment Checklist
Policy Instrument

WTO&
Associated
Agreements

US
EU
Agreements Agreements

X

X

Domestic content requirements
Trade balancing requirements
Foreign exchange restrictions
Domestic sales restrictions
Domestic producer preference
Local management requirements
Technology transfer
Local labor requirements
Headquarters/Production
restrictions
Research
obligations

and

development

Infrastructure provisions
Subsidized credit/entrepreneurship
Administrative guidance
International
restrictions

transfer/payment

1. Performance requirements for foreign direct investment
The WTO treats foreign direct investment (FDI) under two different schemes:
goods and services. Investment measures related to trade in services are covered
under the GATS.
With respect to investment measures related to trade in goods,
the WTO provides a baseline of prohibited measures under two broad WTO
principles.
The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) prohibits
any measures that violate national treatment (Article III) or the general obligation
to eliminate quantitative restrictions (Article XI). It then lays out an illustrative list
148. In EU agreements, these measures may be effectively proscribed by other rules.
149. For local labor requirements, local management requirements, headquarters restrictions,
technology transfer and research and development, a country may not require them as a condition of
entry, but may condition receipt of a benefit on them.
150. Since the policy flexibilities and constraints of the GATS are discussed above (Trade in
Services), this section focuses on WTO treatment of investment measures related to trade in goods.
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of prohibited measures in an appended Annex.15 1 Under TRIMS, countries may
not require that foreign investors achieve a certain level of domestic content in
their goods or prefer domestic producers or products in their production process.152
They may not limit foreign investors' imports in relation to their local production
or export levels. 153 They may not require investors to acquire foreign exchange
only through export, and they may not demand that investors sell a certain amount
of their product within the domestic market (2).154 Furthermore, WTO members
may not create incentives for by requiring any of the above as a condition for
receiving economic advantages.15 5
EU-style agreements treat FDI as the supply of a service through commercial
presence (Mode 3 of the GATS framework). The EU-Chile agreement contains a
separate section entitled "Establishment" that protects the establishment of foreign
investors within the territory of a party.156 EU-CARIFORUM also covers
commercial presence separately from other modes of supply, protecting foreign
investors from measures violating national treatment, MFN and imposing
quantitative restrictions.15 7 All this, however, adds virtually nothing to the basic
WTO standards already in place.
Modem north-south trading regimes can be divided into two camps: TRIMS
and TRIMS+. While the EU generally maintains the TRIMS standard in its trade
agreements, the US tacks on several "plus" provisions that put additional limits on
government policy-makers. In addition to domestic content, trade balancing,
foreign exchange, preference for domestic producers and domestic sales
obligations, US agreements forbid export level requirements, technology and
knowledge transfer demands, local supply exclusivity and management nationality

pre-requisites.s15
The "plus" provisions in US agreements help to shed light on the policy
flexibility available under the TRIMS model. The more permissive model allows
countries to impose numerous measures historically applied to promote local
development, including requirements to export a certain level or percentage of
goods, to transfer technology developed locally, supply exclusively from the
territory, and hire local management.159 Of course, these measures remain subject

151. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Annex, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs].
152. Id. at Annex, 1.
153. Id. at Annex,
1-2.
154. Id. at Annex, 2.
155. Id. at Annex,
1-2; see also CARLOS M. CORREA & NAGESH KUMAR, PROTECTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF A WTO REGIME AND POLICY OPTIONS 76-77 (2003).

156. See EU-Chile, supra note 62, at pt. IV, tit. III, ch. III. While the other EU agreements
incorporate sections entitled "Services and Establishment," as mentioned above, they are largely
agreements to agree in the future rather than active commitments between the parties.
157. EU-CARIFORUM, supranote 62, at arts. 67-68, 70.
158. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1106; DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 10.9; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 10.9; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 15.8.
159. Compare NAFTA, supra note 67, at arts. 1106-07 with TRIMS supra note 151, at annex.
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to the pillars of national treatment and MEN treatment under the WTO, as do all
measures of WTO member countries. 160 Additionally, the GATS permits
developing countries to attach some conditions to their services liberalization
commitments with development in mind. 161
Even under TRIMS+ some flexibilities that countries have employed with
varying success to promote development.Members of US-style agreements may
continue to create incentives for export, technology transfer and backward and
forward linkages by providing advantages to companies that comply with certain
standards. US treaties also permit countries to condition advantages on
compliance with requirements "to locate production, supply a service, train or
employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out research and
development, in its territory."162
Certain other measures lay outside of the scope of these investment
provisions, making them available to all countries that have the capacity to impose
and enforce them. Members of both TRIMS and TRIMS+ agreements may still
invest in local infrastructure to promote direct investment. Countries may also
provide directed credit in key industries to draw investors into specific sectors, and
administrative guidance to multinational companies seeking to expand in to local
markets. 163
2. Capital controls and transfer restrictions
Countries have also attempted to regulate capital flows and other international
transfers and payments to promote and stabilize their development. Restrictions on
foreign portfolio investment (FPI), however, are generally disfavored within
modem trade agreement models. The WTO, EU agreements and US agreements
all prohibit international transfer and payment restrictions presumptively.164 The
difference here lies in the exceptions. The WTO employs the positive list
approach to bind only those sectors with specific liberalization commitments. The
WTO model, mirrored here by most EU agreements, also provides an exception in
the case of "serious balance of payments and external financial difficulties," which
is the primary purpose for such measures. 165
160. Oxfam Services, supra note 117, at 4.
161. GATS, supra note 65, at art. XIX ("There shall be appropriate flexibility for individual
developing country Members for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions,
progressively extending market access in line with their development situation and, when making
access to their markets available to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access conditions aimed
at achieving the objectives referred to in Article IV.").
162. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1106; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 10.9; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 10.5; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 15.8.
163. The test for domestic regulation is articulated in full in Section C.4.
164. GATS, supra note 65, at art. XI; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at arts. 10.8, 11.10; NAFTA,
supra note 67, at art. 1109; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 10.8; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at arts.
8.10, 15.7; EU-Chile, supra note 62, at art. 163; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 29;
EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at art. 33; EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 33. It should be noted that under
the EU agreements, Chile reserved a hefty exception for their investment law 600, and Mexico retains
an exception for exchange and monetary difficulties in addition to balance of payments.
165. EU-Chile, supra note 62, at arts. 166, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at
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The US model, as well as some recent EU agreements like EUCARIFORUM, applies the restriction on capital controls across sectors and
industries. 166 Foreign capital receives the same treatment as foreign companies
here - protection regardless of any specific liberalization commitments. US-style
agreements also place one more restraint on policy options by omitting the balance
of payments exception.
3. Investor-State Arbitration
The US goes one step further, indirectly binding policy-makers' hands in
introducing investment measures through investor-state arbitration. Unlike the
WTO and EU-style agreements, which only make room for dispute resolution
between treaty partners, the US allows private investors to sue states for interfering
with the value of their investment. 16 7 They rely on general treaty language
prohibiting expropriation, discrimination, unfair or inequitable treatment, which
has been interpreted broadly by private arbitral tribunals. 168 NAFTA is the only
agreement in force long enough to have a history of investor-state disputes and
since then a few agreements have attempted to clarify certain treaty standards. 169
However, more recent agreements that contain the same investor-state arbitration
provisions do not escape the risk of regulatory chill caused by NAFTA's
arbitration history.
4. South-south investment liberalization and protection
In response to the constraints of the US model investment provision, some
developing countries have created south-south trading relationships, like
MERCOSUR and CAN, that liberalize investment regionally and protect against
foreign investors from without.170 Both MERCOSUR and CAN echo provisions of
N-S agreements. MERCOSUR incorporates the US model language for national
treatment and CAN prohibits transfer and payments restrictions.
However, they
arts. 30-31; EU-S.A., supra note 63, at arts. 32-34; EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at art. 35. See also,
GATS, supranote 65, at art. XII.
166. DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art 10.8; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 10.8; US-Singapore,
supra note 67, at art. 15.7; NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 1109; EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at
arts. 122-24
167. Compare EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at Ch. 2 and Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125, (1994) [hereinafter DSU] with DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at Section B.
168. Gus Van Harten, Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime in THE FUTURE OF NORTH
AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA 59, A Task Force Report (Frederick S. Pardee

Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, November 2009).
169. Rachel D. Edsall, Note, Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential
Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L. REv. 931, 952 (2006).
170. For example, the MERCOSUR Protocol on Investment Promotion and Protection contains the
same national treatment standard as that provided under US agreements. MERCOSUR Investment,
supra note 65, at art. 3. Likewise. CAN Decision 292 allows multinational enterprises the right to
establish subsidiaries, transfer payments freely, and transfer their domicile freely. CAN Andean
Business, supra note 65, at art. 15.
171. MERCOSUR Investment, supra note 65, at art. 3; CAN Andean Business, supra note 65, at
art. 15ff.
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enforce strict ownership requirements on foreign firms in order for them to qualify
for protection under the regime. Under CAN, for example, companies must be
owned at least 60 percent by national investors of two or more Community
Members.172 Additionally, for any country whose investor contributes at least 15
percent of the capital for the enterprise, one of the directors must be a national of
that country. 173
These S-S trade agreements provide an example of how to combine
substantial investment liberalization with regional protection of nascent industry.
The nature of the trading partner makes a difference however, as bargaining and
informational asymmetries between developed and developing countries lead to NS arrangements with the same terms placing undesired constraints on policymakers. Beyond investment protection, one more area of "trade-related" discipline
has drawn the attention of international human rights groups and developing
nations alike: intellectual property rules.
E. InternationalIntellectualPropertyProtection
Historically, countries have employed intellectual property rules in an attempt
to balance global integration with domestic development, correcting informational
asymmetries while creating financial incentives for inventors, and protecting
private property.
This balance has become particularly contentious when
protecting private property leads to limiting access to necessary medicines.174
Wealthier countries, as knowledge exporters, have prioritized incentives for
knowledge creation, while poor countries, as knowledge importers have favored
incentives for knowledge dissemination. 175
Today, however, the global trade regime places increasing limits on the
ability of developing countries to promote such dissemination. International
intellectual property rules have come under attack, in part, because of their adverse
effect on medicinal availability in the developing world. For that reason, the WTO
issued the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha
Declaration), which emphasized the importance of developing country concerns
about their access to medicines.176 Despite the controversy, the US continues to
push for stronger inventor incentives at the expense of policy flexibility. Table 8
provides a broad picture of the policy constraints over IPRS.

172. CAN Andean Business, supra note 65, at art. 1(d) (defining "multinational Andean enterprise"
as a firm in which investors of two or more member countries owns more than 60% of the company).
173. Id. at art. 1(e).
174. KENNETH SHADLEN, POLICY SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE WTO AND BEYOND:
THE CASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 23 (Global Dev't and Env't Inst., Working Paper
No. 05-06 2005), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/05-06PolicySpace.pdf.
175. Id. at 6.
176. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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Table 8. Intellectual Property Checklist
WTO

Policy Instrument

and US

Associated
Agreements

Patent
restriction
industry/origin

by

IP
protection
Limit
plants/animals

for

Permit
early-working
patented pharmaceuticals

on

Agreement
s

EU
Agreements

Compulsory Licensing
Local production requirement
Parallel imports
Limiting patent breadth
Utility models
1. Patent restriction by industry, origin or duration
The most direct way of intervening in the delicate balance between
information dissemination and information protection is by controlling the
industries, origins and duration of patent terms. In this one question, these three
trade agreement models concur. Patent restriction by industry, origin or duration is
patently (no pun intended) prohibited under the Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO. TRIPS states that "patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
of industrial application."17 7 This language is echoed in all US trade agreements
and likewise incorporated into most EU agreements by reference. 178 TRIPS also
requires that all patents last 20 years, minimum, a duration limit adopted by both
EU and US agreements. 179

177. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (emphasis added).
178. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1709; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 15.9; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 17.9; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supranote
62, at art. 36(1)(a); EU-Chile, supra note 62, at art. 170(a)(i); EU-S.A., supranote 62, at art. 46.
179. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 33.; NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1709, 12. This minimum
is not even mentioned in DR-CAFTA, US-Chile, or US-Singapore, but is implied. The minimum is
likewise not mentioned explicitly in EU trade agreements.
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2. Limited plant and animal protection
For countries where populations rely heavily on traditional knowledge of
plants and animals, limiting protection of such intellectual property ensures that the
people will continue to have needed access to food and medicines. Although plant
and animal species are generally found in nature (and therefore not new or
innovative), the US and other developed countries have sought intellectual
property protection for genetically modified plant species-a move that places
access of native populations to their traditional knowledge in jeopardy. All
international IPR regimes, demand some protection over knowledge derived from
plant and animal life. TRIPS allows that countries to exclude plants and animals
from patentability, with the exception of micro-organisms, but requires that some
81
180 effective protection for plant varieties by put into place.
This requirements
admits some theoretical flexibility for WTO members to establish their own plant
variety protection systems - a flexibility that many countries have exploited. 182
Bilateral north-south trade models have tightened that flexibility down,
specifying a minimum type of plant variety protection required to comply with the
agreement. EU agreements, for example, often require trade partners who have not
yet acceded to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV), either from 1978 or 1991,183 do so within a reasonable time from
entry into force and US agreements generally require accession to the latter. 18 4
The US model also demands that contracting states "make every effort" to impose
a plant patenting system.18 US-Singapore even omits the TRIPS flexibility of
excluding plants from the patent system. 186
3. Information disclosure and "Bolar" provisions
Some countries promote knowledge dissemination by establishing strict
information disclosure requirements. They then make the information available to
generics producers and domestic inventors who want to piggy back off the
patented invention or begin working on generic equivalents before the patent term
ends.187 The TRIPS model requires that patent applicants disclose the information
necessary "for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art."s18 It
also allows members to demand that applicants "indicate the best mode for

180. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 27.
18 1. Id.
182. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 12-13.
183. The key difference between the 1978 and 1991 conventions is found in their allowance of
third parties "to use protected seeds and plants for breeding new varieties". Shadlen, supranote 174, at
13. UPOV 1978, included a farmers exception allowing them to reuse seeds. This exception was
eliminated under UPOV 1991, "which provides much stronger rights to breeders." Id.
184. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 15.1, T 5; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 17.1, T 3; USSingapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.1, T 2. NAFTA, largely because of when it was negotiated and
signed, required only the UPOV 1978. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1701.2.
185. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 15.9, 1 2; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 17.9, T 2.
186. US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7, T 1.
187. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 29.
188. Id.atart.29.1.
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carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the filing date."18 9 Even on
unpatented products, countries often require applicants to submit additional data
for regulatory approval.
Early working or "Bolar" provisions build on these disclosure requirements,
permitting producers to develop, test, and begin the registration process for generic
versions of patented pharmaceuticals before the end of the patent term.190
Although the text of TRIPS only proscribes "unfair commercial use" of protected
data, WTO case law reveals that TRIPS permits early working so long as it does
not result in commercial production or stockpiling purposes.191
While EU agreements are modeled after the TRIPS standards, the US model
favors knowledge creation and protection. US agreements do not allow more than
minimum disclosure requirements and they protect data submitted for regulatory
approval for at least five years "against both disclosure and reliance. 192
4. Compulsory licensing
In order to gain access to patented drugs and necessary technology in the
absence of a traditionally negotiated license, governments have granted
compulsory licenses (CLs) to domestic industry to make and distribute those
products. 19 3 TRIPS establishes the internationally accepted procedural standard for
CLs, implicitly adopted by both EU and US trade agreements.TRIPS Article 31
requires that countries consider each license individually, that they attempt to
negotiate a license from the patent holder "on reasonable commercial terms" over a
reasonable period of time (except in situations of national emergency), that they
limit the scope and duration of the license to a specific purpose, that they grant a
non-exclusive and non-assignable license, that they grant it only for the domestic
market and that they subject it to judicial review, among other procedural

requirements.194
Countries have also used CLs in order to encourage local production of
patented products. Brazil, for example, allows the government to grant CLs to
local producers when a patented good is not produced locally within 3 years from
the beginning of the patent term. This promotes "the transfer of non-codified, tacit
knowledge that occurs via the localization of manufacturing operations." 95
Although these measures have been somewhat controversial, no WTO ruling has
outlawed them and they remain available under TRIPS.
Some US agreements have circumscribed the use of CLs beyond the
procedural requirements of Article 31 and definitively prohibited such local

189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 18-19.
191. Id. at 19; TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 39, 3. This standard has been determined by WTO
case law and is not necessarily clear from the text of the agreement. Id.
192. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 19; see, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 15.10, T 1.
193. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 21.
194. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 31.
195. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 22.
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production requirements. 196 US-Singapore, for example, only allows CLs to
remedy anti-competitive practices, for public non-commercial use or in the case of
national emergency. 197 Furthermore, patent term marketing restrictions in
agreements such as DR-CAFTA may create an effective ban on compulsory
licensing. 198
US-Peru, on the other hand, incorporates the 2003 Doha Declaration on
Public Health, recommitting to Article 31 which emphasizes that countries may
establish their own grounds for providing CLs, and allows countries to grant these
licenses for export to least developed countries and to countries without production
capacity. 199 The recent US-Peru agreement may be evidence of international
pressure to improve access to medicines for the poorest populations, and indicate
that even bilateral agreements cannot place too many limits on policy space in this

area.200
5. Patent exhaustion
As an indirect route to promoting access to needed technologies, countries
may establish their own exhaustion policies under TRIPS - whether national,
regional or international - implicitly permitting parallel imports of goods where
the patent holder's rights have been exhausted.201 Where international exhaustion
policies apply, a producer from a developing country could purchase goods from
an industrialized country producer, repackage the goods and undersell the
industrialized producer in a third country. Developing countries can use this
advantage to increase competition and drive down prices, making patented
products more affordable.202
Since exhaustion is a matter of domestic policy, few trade agreements have
addressed the issue. The US applies a national standard of exhaustion which
allows patent holders to assert their patent rights against all parallel imports,
regardless of their origin.203 Within the European Community, countries apply a

196. US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 17.9, 1 4; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 15.9(5); USSingapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7(5). Once more, the early conclusion of NAFTA resulted in a
substantially different intellectual property rights regime. Since the conclusion of NAFTA, the US
model has evolved and moved further away from the more flexible disciplines in TRIPS.
197. US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7, 6.
198. Id. at art. 15.10(2); Frederick M. Abbott, The DohaDeclarationon the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health and the Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements 14
(Quaker United Nations Office Occasional Paper, 2004).
199. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
(2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0l e/mindecl trips e.htm (last visited Dec. 8,
2009); Peru TPA Final Text art. 16.13, April 12, 2006, USTR, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfin send/1031 [hereinafter US-Peru].
200. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 24.
201. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 6.
202. Shadlen, supra note 174, at 20.
203. International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), United States of
America Report Q156 (for the United States Group, Leonard B. Mackey and Andrew H. Simpson) 1,
available at https://www.aippi.org/download/comitees/156/GR156usa.pdf [hereinafter AIPPI].
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regional exhaustion policy which protects against parallel imports from outside the
Union.204 A few US agreements, however, have attempted to export the national
standard to treaty partners. US FTAs with Morocco and Australia both demand
that the countries recognize national exhaustion of patent rights.205 Although EU
agreements have not, thus far, exported their exhaustion policies to their trade
partners, regional exhaustion will restrict producers originating outside the Union
from competing with EU patent holders by way of parallel imports.
6. Patent alternatives
Unlike the above aspects of patent protection, countries retain flexibility in
limiting patent breadth and protecting otherwise unpatentable inventions through
"utility models".206 The latter measures, in particular, provide local residents with
room for creative expansion on existing patents and incentives for their own
experimentation.
Neither the more permissive WTO model nor US-style agreements address
patent breadth or utility models directly. Some EU agreements, however,
expressly allow utility models "provided that they are new, involve some degree of
nonobviousness and are capable of industrial application." 207 Although it is not
clear whether such a provision would increase the use of utility models by
mentioning them, or further tie the hands of policy makers by the limiting the
conditions under which they are granted, it at least shows promise that the
developed world recognizes other types of invention incentives.208
7. South-south responses and the US model
For developing countries, intellectual property rights represents a new area of

trade-related issues that has yet to be addressed under most south-south
agreements. The Andean Community, however, has established a model S-S
arrangement that includes intellectual property provisions aimed at promoting the
interests of the nations in that region. First of all, the CAN demands that patent
applications based on material obtained from traditional knowledge meet the
requirements of international law, the Andean Community and domestic law with
respect to acquisition of that material.209 In addition, the Community excludes

204. Prof Dr. Joseph Straus, The Present State of the Patent System in the European Union: As
compared with the situation in the United States of America and Japan, available at
http://suepo.org/public/docs/2001/straus.pdf; see also Ladas and Perry LLP, II Preventing parallel
imports
under
trademark
law,
Section
B,
available
at
http://www.ladas.con/IPProperty/GrayMarket/GrayMa02.html#Heading4.
205. Morocco FTA Final Text art. 17.9(4), June 15, 2004, USTR, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text;
Australia FTA
Final Text art. 15.9(4), May 18, 2004, USTR, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text.
206. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 15-16.
207. EU-CARIFORUM, supranote 62, at art. 148.
208. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 20.
209. CAN IPRs, supra note 65, at art. 3.
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scientific theories, mathematical methods, an d living things (whatever the size),
among other pursuits, from patentability.2 10
Like many developing countries, the Decisions of the CAN Secretariat apply
an international standard for exhaustion, making room for the benefits provided by
parallel imports.2 1 1 Also similar to Brazil's intellectual property law (see above),
the CAN allows compulsory licensing when the patent holder does not exploit the
patent locally within three years of the grant of that patent.212 Finally, the Decision
explicitly mentions utility models, which can encourage a lower degree of
innovation often "more appropriate for local firms." 2 13
The Andean Community model for South-South intellectual property
protection demonstrates how developing countries can work together to encourage
information dissemination and establish financial incentives for creativity.
Unfortunately, as countries seek trade agreements with both the global north and
global south, the CAN model has come into conflict with the more restrictive US
agreement model.
The US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (a comprehensive FTA) entered
into force in January of 2009. As a condition of the agreement, Peru must
undertake "reasonable efforts" to establish a plant patenting system - a measure
that is forbidden under the Andean Community intellectual property regime. The
CAN Commission met multiple times to consider this and other conflicts between
the agreements and it concluded that Peru (and the other Andean nations) may
"develop and deepen" intellectual property protection through trade agreements
with the US. 214 If this trend continues, then the flexibilities exploited in southsouth regional integration will be short-lived and the US model may become the de
facto standard for intellectual property protection.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis of various types of trade agreements shows that the current
global trade regime substantially curtails the ability of countries to maintain
control over various policy tools that traditionally have been deployed as part of
long run development paths.215 Still, under the WTO, despite the constraint on
policy space, there remains considerable room to maneuver. Countries may,
legally, raise and lower tariffs, provide tax-related export incentives such as

210. Id. at art. 15.
211. Id. at art. 54; SISULE F. MUsuNGU, SUSAN VILLANUEVA, & ROXANNA BLASETTI, UTILIZING
TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL

FRAMEWORKS 51 (South Centre 2004), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=
com content&task=view&id=72.
212. CAN IPRs, supra note 65, at arts. 61, 65-66.
213. Id. at arts. 81-85; Shadlen, supranote 174, at 16.
214. Marienella Ramirez, El Perg logra allanar el camino para TLC con Estados Unidos,
ELCOMERCIO.COM.PE (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/edicionimpresa/
Html/2008-08-15/el-peru-logra-allanar-camino-tlc-estados-unidos.html.
215. Part of the reasons for this is that, with the spread of globalization, no issue is truly "uniquely"
domestic. Even though industry standards, licensures, and certifications may be matters of domestic
law, they impact foreign companies and, by extension, foreign governments.
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drawbacks and deferrals within EPZs, impose certain performance requirements on
investors and service providers, and employ domestic patent laws to prioritize
information dissemination over incentives for invention. The WTO also makes
extra room for developing countries to form bilateral and regional trade
agreements under the Enabling Clause. 216
Despite wide variation among bilateral and regional agreements, policy space
under north-south free trade agreements are the most constraining on the
traditional industrial development toolkit. Overwhelmingly, among both bilateral
agreements and the multilateral trade regime, the trend heads toward demanding
increased liberalization and decreased government intervention in the economy.
At the same time, some types of agreements continue to make space for the
policies aimed at industrial development, while others push for broader and deeper
liberalization. As shown above, trade agreements with the EU retain much of the
flexibility under the WTO in the areas of investment and intellectual property, and
employ the same positive-list approach as the global regime when it comes to
services trade. By contrast, the US imposes many additional disciplines on its
trading partners-expanding
patent protection, mandating
investment
liberalization, and employing a negative-list approach to services bindings. Since
the early 1990s,trade regimes have formed around these principles and US trade
policy has become more uniform. Meanwhile, EU trade policy varies by trading
partner, indicating a greater willingness to permit certain policies in these areas.
Provided this trend continues, countries that are still developing in thirty years will
have more opportunity to creatively use their policy space under an EU agreement
than under an agreement with the US.
Many S-S agreements are still formally notified to the WTO under Article
XXIV; yet they often provide the greatest policy space among the agreements we
studied. This flexibility derives not from lacking affirmative trade disciplines but
from using trade liberalization between developing countries to protect industries
and promote growth regionally. Investment and intellectual property rules under
the CAN provide the clearest example here. The CAN rules of origin establish
protection for regional firms against extra-regional companies. In addition, the
CAN explicitly protects traditional knowledge, tightens patentability requirements
and makes room for local, non-patentable innovation.
Still, some policy space remains under even the most restrictive trading
schemes. To the extent the state is economically capable, a country may invest
heavily in public education, subsidize credit to certain industries, and build up
domestic infrastructure. A method employed by developing and developed
countries alike, policy makers may also provide administrative guidancemarketing the country, its location, natural resources, and workforce, for
example-to investors and traders internationally. This technique may help a

216. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVORABLE TREATMENT:
RECIPROCITY AND FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Decision of 28 November 1979

(L/4903), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/enabling e.pdf
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country to target an industry that would transfer technology or provide backward
and forward linkages in the economy.
This paper is far from the final word on this subject. Indeed, it may perhaps
raise more questions than those that are answered. Each subject could be its own
separate paper, pursuing in more depth the implied and actual flexibilities inherent
in the global trading regime. For that reason, this paper aims only to give an
overview of the policies available to countries today, and point out some
significant differences between the various types of trade agreements. Going
forward, interesting ideas for further research are numerous. A legal analysis of
the dispute settlement cases under each regime would shed more light on the extent
to which the rules against selective policies have actually been enforced. Political
scientists might explore whether the divergence within international regimes, such
as that of the EU-Latin American agreements and the EU-African agreements, is
rooted in the geography of the trading partners, their development level, or other
factors.
From a policy perspective, it is our hope that negotiators and policy-makers
who have or are considering crafting longer run development strategies can use
this paper as a reference when deciding under which policy regimes such
development strategies would be most permissible. Just shy of 60 percent of the
people on the planet live in poverty, measured by the World Bank as less than
$2.50 per day. To raise the standard of living for those people, governments seek
to put together long-term development strategies that deploy the policy instruments
that have proven successful in other settings. This paper catalogues many of the
policies deployed by successful developed and developing countries that over a

35+ year period tripled the average incomes of many countries such as the US,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and now China. We show that today, however,
poorer nations have a more limited toolkit to engage in long-run development
strategies, and that the trade arrangements they form will have an influence on the
policies they will have available in the future.

